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A multipartner secure direct communication protocol is presented, using quantum nonlocality.
Security of this protocol is based on ‘High fidelity implies low entropy’. When the entanglement was
successfully distributed, anyone of the multipartner can send message secretly by using local opera-
tion and reliable public channel. Since message transfered only by using local operation and public
channel after entanglement successfully distributed, so this protocol can protect the communication
against destroying-travel-qubit-type attack.
Since the pioneering work of Bennett and Brassard published in 1984 [1], different quantum key distribution pro-
tocols has been presented [2-15]. Different from the key distribution protocol, some quantum direct secure communi-
cation (QDSC) protocols have been shown recently [16-18], which permits important message can be communication
directly without first establishing a random key to encrypt them. However, these protocols [1-18] only permit message
transferred from the sender (Alice) to the receiver (Bob). In reference [19], a protocol was presented that allows Alice
and Bob communicate with each other coequally. When Alice want to secretly send message to two or more persons
at the same time, the protocols based on entanglement of two qubit are feeble. In this paper, we show a secure direct
communication protocol that allows multipartner instantaneously communicating secretly by using .
The multipartner protocol. Three qubit can be entangled in a Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state |φ0 > [20]
|φ0 >= 1√
2
(|0 > |0 > |0 > +|1 > |1 > |1 >), (1)
where |0 > and |1 > are the up and down eigenstate of the σz , the photon polarization operator. Suppose three
partners, Alice , Bob and Charlie, want to secretly communicate together. First of all, Alice prepares three qubits in
a GHZ state |φ0 >. She keeps one qubit and sends each of the other two qubits to Bob and Charlie. When Bob and
Charlie receive the travel, both of them send a classical signal as receipt to Alice through public channel. When Alice
receives their receipt, she states this is a message mode in public. Then Alice, bob and Charlie perform a measurement
in basis Bz = {|0 >, |1 >}. If Alice’s measurement is |0 > (|1 >), then she knows Bob and Charlie’s measurement
outcome are |0 > (|1 >). When she wants to send a classical bit ‘0’ to Alice and Bob, if her measurement is |0 >,
then she ‘say yes’ in public. If her measurement is |1 >, then she ‘say no’ through public channel to both Bob and
Charlie. When Alice wants to send a logical ‘1’ to Bob and Charlie, if her measurement outcome is |0>, she ‘say no’
in public. Else, she ’say yes’ to Bob and Charlie through public channel. By default, Alice, Bob and Charlie are in
message mode and communicate the way described above. With probability c, Alice switches to control mode. In
control mode. when Alice receives Bob and Charlie’s receipt, she performs a measurement randomly in basis Bz or
Bx = {|+ >, |− >}, where |+ >= 1√
2
(|0 > +|1 >), |− >= 1√
2
(|0 > −|1 >). Then she announces her measurement
outcome. Bob and Charlie also switch to control mode. They perform measurement in the same basis Alice used. If
their measurement outcomes do not coincide when both of them use the basis Bz, there is an eavesdropper-Eve in
linear. When they use the basis Bx, their measurement outcome should be in the states |± >. Using
σx|+ >= |+ >, σx|− >= −|− >, (2)
when the products of σAx (Alice), σ
B
x (Bob), and σ
C
x (Charlie) is −1, there is an Eve in line. The communication
stops. Else, this communication continues.
Security proof . To effectively eavesdrop Alice’s information, Eve has to distinguish what state Bob or Charlie
obtains since she has no access to Alice’s qubit. It has been presented that there two inequivalent forms of three
qubits entangled state [21]. One is namely GHZ state. The other is |W >
|W >= 1√
3
(|1 > |0 > |0 > +|0 > |1 > |0 > +|0 > |0 > |1 >). (3)
1
These two different states can not be converted by means of SLOCC [21]. After Eve’s attack, the state will become
a product state or still is a GHZ-type state
|φ1 > = 1√
2
(|0 > |0 > |0 > −|1 > |1 > |1 >), (4)
|φ2 > = 1√
2
(|1 > |0 > |0 > +|0 > |1 > |1 >), (5)
|φ3 > = 1√
2
(|1 > |0 > |0 > −|0 > |1 > |1 >), (6)
|φ4 > = 1√
2
(|0 > |1 > |0 > +|1 > |0 > |1 >), (7)
|φ5 > = 1√
2
(|0 > |1 > |0 > −|1 > |0 > |1 >), (8)
|φ6 > = 1√
2
(|0 > |0 > |1 > +|1 > |1 > |0 >), (9)
|φ7 > = 1√
2
(|0 > |0 > |1 > −|1 > |1 > |0 >). (10)
Together with |φ0 >, these eight states compose a complete base. Suppose the state |φ0 > becomes ρ under Eve’s
attack. ρ must be a linear combination of |φi >. The fidelity [22] of ρ and |φ0 > is
F (|φ0 > , ρ) = tr
√
< φ0|ρ|φ0 > |ψ− >< ψ−| (11)
=
√
< φ0|ρ|φ0 >
‘High fidelity implies low entropy.’ Assume F (|φ0 >, ρ)2 = 1 − γ. The information from ρ is bounded by the Holevo
quantity, χ(ρ) [23]. From
χ(ρ) = S(ρ)−
∑
i
piρi, (12)
we know that S(ρ) is the upper bound of the information Eve can gain. The entropy of ρ is bounded above by the
entropy a diagonal density matrix ρmax with diagonal entries 1− γ, γ7 , ..., γ7 . The entropy of ρmax is
S(ρmax) = −(1− γ) log(1− γ)− γ log γ
7
. (13)
Let us consider the relation between the information Eve can gain and detection probability d. When ρ is anyone of
|φi >, i = 2, ..., 7, Alice, Bob and Charlie can perform the measurement in basis Bz and public their measurement
outcomes. When their measurement outcomes do not coincide, there is an Eve in line. When ρ is the state |φ1 >,
Alice, Bob and Charlie can perform a measurement in basis Bx and public their measurement outcome:
A B C product
+1 +1 −1 −1
+1 −1 +1 −1
−1 +1 +1 −1
−1 −1 −1 −1
comparing with the measurement outcomes of |φ0 >:
A B C product
+1 +1 +1 +1
+1 −1 −1 +1
−1 +1 −1 +1
−1 −1 +1 +1
.
When they find out that the product of their outcomes is −1, there is an Eve in line. Since the fidelity F (|φ0 >, ρ)2 =
1 − γ, then the detection probability d is approximately linearly dependent on the quantity d ≥ γ/2. When γ = 0,
2
there is S(ρmax) = 0, i.e., Eve can get no information from the communication. When S(ρmax) > 0, i.e., Eve can get
some information from the communication, she has to face a nonzero risk to be detected.
This protocol is quasisecure for a direct communication but is secure for a quantum key distribution protocol.
Also, multipartner can communication using two-particle entanglement network. However, our protocol can provide
a secure direct communication between three partners. Actually, Alice, Bob and Charlie are coequal in this protocol.
So they can communicate with others coequally when the entanglement was successfully shared. Consider there are N
partner want to communicate securely. They can share N- particle GHZ states. With local measurement and classical
message, they can communicate securely. When N-particle entanglement was successfully shared, no qubit has to be
exchanged in quantum channel. Then the destroying-travel-qubit-type attack [19] is invalid.
Entanglement of three photons has been demonstrate experimental [24]. And the quantum nonlocality of four
photons entanglement has already been reported [25]. The experimental feasibility of our protocol, can be realized
with today’s technology.
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